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RELATIONALLY SPEAKING: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF TREATING
EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY IN A
CANADIAN CONTEXT
Kathleen Hammond
In July 2018, the Ontario Superior Court, in S.H. v D.H.,
dealt with a dispute between a recently separated couple
over a frozen embryo that the couple had created. In his
judgment, Justice Del Frate stated that the embryo should
be conceived of as property. This was the cause of uproar
among feminist legal scholars who were concerned with
the possible repercussions for cisgender women of labeling
embryos as property. The Superior Court decision was
subsequently overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal
this past May (2019). However, given the likelihood that
embryos will be treated as property in future disputes, it is
important to assess what the ramifications of this type of
categorization might be.
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In this paper, I employ a feminist relational
analysis in order to analyze the implications that
categorizing embryos as property might have for three
relationships involving cisgender women. I identify these
relationships to be: (1) the relationship between
cisgendered heterosexual intended parents, (2) the
relationship between intended mothers, the embryo, and
society, and (3) the relationship between intended
parent(s) and an egg donor and/or surrogate. Ultimately, I
find that categorizing embryos as property adds to an
alarming power imbalance between cisgendered
heterosexual intended parents when they are separating
and trying to make decisions about what to do with frozen
embryos. Secondly, I argue that there are compelling
reasons that categorizing embryos as property could
perpetuate the idea that cisgender women’s bodies are
ownable, and that egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies are
commodities. These are views that could have the effect of
perpetuating
the
long-term
oppression
and
disempowerment of cisgender women. If the trend towards
treating embryos as property continues to grow, a feminist
reconceptualization of property, such as that proposed by
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky would be an important, albeit
slow, step to alter notions that cisgender women can be
owned or commoditized.
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INTRODUCTION
In July of 2018 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice issued
a judgment on a dispute over frozen embryos.1 The dispute
was between forty-eight-year-old D.H. and her former
husband S.H.2 The couple had purchased donated eggs and
sperm from a gamete agency in Georgia, United States
which they then used to create two viable embryos.3 One
of the resulting embryos was implanted in D.H., who gave
birth to their son.4 The one remaining embryo was the
source of conflict in the case. Whilst D.H. sought to use the
embryo, S.H. wanted the embryo to be donated.5 Neither
party had a genetic connection with the embryo.6 The
parties had signed contracts both in Ontario and Georgia
agreeing that the embryo would be treated as property.7
The Ontario contract left the decision to D.H. (the patient)
and said that on separation of the spouses, D.H.’s wishes
should be respected.8 The Georgia contract left the decision
to the court.9 Justice Robert Del Frate held that the dispute

1

See SH v DH, 2018 ONSC 4506 [SH ONSC].

2

See ibid at paras 1–3, 6, 13.

3

See ibid at para 4.

4

See ibid at para 5.

5

See ibid at paras 1–2.

6

See ibid at para 4.

7

See ibid at para 8.

8

See ibid at para 9.

9

See ibid at paras 28–29.
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needed to be decided based on the contracts that the parties
had signed.10
In his judgment, he wrote that the Georgia contract
went against contract law by putting the responsibility of
deciding what to do with the embryo on the court.11 In his
opinion, the parties knew what they were agreeing to when
they signed the contract and they could not subsequently
apply “buyer’s remorse.”12 Ultimately, Justice Del Frate
followed the Ontario contract, meaning that the embryo
went to D.H. However, he went on to say that “[i]t is also
clear that the embryo is property,”13 and since this is a
division of property, S.H. should be reimbursed his half of
the value of the embryo—a sum of US$1,438.14
S.H. appealed the decision in May 2019 and the
Ontario Court of Appeal released a decision written by
Justice Fairburn, which overturned the Superior Court’s
decision.15 Justice Fairburn wrote that neither contract, nor
property law principles governed in this case.16 She found
that the case should be decided based on the consent-based
model imposed by Parliament.17 In Canada, the Assisted

10

See ibid at para 25.

11

See ibid at para 31.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid at para 33.

14

See ibid at para 34.

15

See SH v DH, 2019 ONCA 454 [SH ONCA].

16

See ibid at para 4.

17

See ibid at para 5.
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Human Reproduction Act, 2004 (AHRA)18 and its
associated Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8
Consent) Regulations (AHRA Regulations)19 govern the
use, donation and disposal of human embryos.20 Under the
18

Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA].

19

Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) Regulations,
SOR/2007-137 [AHR Consent Regulations].

20

The AHRA came into force in 2004 after many years in the making.
Members of a royal commission (the “Baird Commission”) had
assessed Canadians’ opinions on assisted reproductive technologies
and published a report called Proceed with Care in 1993. See Ottawa,
Privy Council Office, Proceed with Care - Final Report of the Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (1993) (Chair:
Patricia Baird) [Royal Commission on NRTs]. There were then four
attempts to pass legislation before Bill C-6 became the AHRA. Less
than two years after the Act came into force, the Quebec government
challenged the constitutionality of many of its sections on the basis that
it impinged upon provincial jurisdiction. See Renvoi fait par le
gouvernement du Québec en vertu de la Loi sur les renvois à la Cour
d'appel, LRQ, ch R-23, relativement à la constitutionnalité des articles
8 à 19, 40 à 53, 60, 61 et 68 de la Loi sur la procréation assistée, LC
2004, ch 2 (Dans l'affaire du), 2008 QCCA 1167. The Quebec Court
of Appeal concluded that the provisions were ultra vires Parliament.
The Attorney General of Canada appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court of Canada (SCC), which declared many of the provisions of the
Act unconstitutional. See Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction
Act, 2010 SCC 61. The sections dealing with the use, donation, and
disposal of human embryos are among some of the few sections that
were not repealed. See e.g. Dave Snow, Assisted Reproduction Policy
in Canada: Framing, Federalism, and Failure (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2018) for commentary on the AHRA. See e.g. Vanessa
Gruben & Angela Cameron, “Quebec’s Constitutional Challenge to the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Overlooking Women’s
Reproductive Autonomy” in Stephanie Paterson, Francesca Scala &
Marlene K Sokolon, eds, Fertile Ground (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2014) 126 for commentary specifically on the SCC
case.
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AHRA, no one can use an embryo without the consent of
the “donor.”21 The AHRA Regulations explain that a donor
is the individual, spouse, or common-law partners who the
embryo was created for.22 When the two people who
created the embryo were spouses or common-law partners,
when the embryo was created, both of them have to consent
to use or donate the embryo, regardless of whether they
were genetic contributors or not.23 This means that even if
a couple breaks up, both members need to consent to the
embryo’s disposition, even if they used donor gametes.
However, if only one of them is a genetic contributor, and
the relationship ends before the embryo is used, then the
person who provided their genetic material gets exclusive
control over the embryo.24 Disputes arise in cases where
both members of the couple have provided genetic
material, or as in the case of S.H. and D.H., where both
members of the couple did not contribute genetic material,
and they cannot agree on what to do with the embryo(s).
In Quebec, this issue is expressly dealt with through
An Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Related
to Assisted Procreation (Act Respecting Assisted
21

AHRA, supra note 18, s 8(3).

22

See AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 19, s 10(1)(a) and (b).

23

See ibid, s 10(1)(b), which explains that a donor can be defined as “the
couple who are spouses or common-law partners at the time the invitro embryo is created, regardless of the source of the human
reproductive material used to create the embryo”. See also ibid, s 10(2),
which explains that both members of the couple have to consent.

24

See ibid, s 10(3), which explains that if the embryo was created from
the reproductive material of only one member of the couple, and the
relationship breaks down, then only that individual is considered the
donor.
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Procreation)25 and its associated regulations the
Regulation Respecting Clinical Activities Related to
Assisted Procreation (Regulation Respecting Assisted
Procreation).26 The regulations require that parties have to
agree, before the embryos are created or frozen, about what
will happen to the embryos should one party withdraw their
consent.27 No other provinces or territories have put in
place legislation dealing with what parties should do in the
event that they do not agree about disposition. Since the
dispute between S.H. and D.H. took place in Ontario, only
the AHRA applies. Justice Fairburn ultimately found that
S.H. was entitled to withdraw his consent to D.H. using the
embryos, and that the Ontario contract did not take away
this right.28
Much debate has surrounded what embryos are,
whether they are “property,” “people,” or something in
between—a sui generis category for instance.29 Legal
scholar Stefanie Carsley argues that it is clear from

25

See An Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Relating to
Assisted Procreation, RSQ 2009, c A-5.01 [Act Respecting Assisted
Procreation] and its associated Regulation Respecting Clinical
Activities Related to Assisted Procreation, OC 644-2010, 7 July 2010,
(2010) GOQ II 2253, ss 19–20 [Regulation Respecting Assisted
Procreation].

26

Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 25, s 19.

27

See ibid, s 21.

28

See SH ONCA, supra note 15 at para 21.

29

See Alana Cattapan & Françoise Baylis, “Frozen in Perpetuity:
‘Abandoned Embryos’ in Canada” (2015) 1:2 Reproductive
Biomedicine & Society 104 at 109.
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Canadian law that embryos are not persons.30 Canadian
case law31 confirms that fetuses are not human beings. The
definition of an embryo in the AHRA makes it clear that
embryos are less developed than fetuses.32 Thus, it follows
that embryos are also not persons.33 The Royal
Commission Report, “Proceed with Care,” upon which the
AHRA was based, recommended treating embryos as
property.34 However, treating embryos like other property
amounts embryos to something which can be bought and
sold, and this would be contrary to the AHRA’s prohibition
on the commercialization of reproductive material.35
Although it was overturned by the Ontario Court of
Appeal, the Superior Court’s decision in the dispute
between S.H. and D.H. was the most recent of three
Canadian cases that demonstrate Canadian courts’
willingness to treat reproductive material as property in the
context of disputes between couples or friends. In 2005, the
30

See Stefanie Carsley, “Rethinking Canadian Legal Responses to
Frozen Embryo Disputes” (2014) 29:1 Can J Fam L 55 at 83, n 78
[Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”]; Stefanie Carsley,
Conceiving a Feminist Legal Approach to Frozen Embryos: Exploring
the Limitations of Canadian Responses to Disposition Disputes and
Donor Anonymity (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto, 2013)
[unpublished] at 40, n 69.

31

See e.g. Tremblay v Daigle, [1989] 2 SCR 530, 62 DLR (4th) 634
[Tremblay]; Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v
G (DF), [1997] 3 SCR 925, 152 DLR (4th) 193.

32

See AHRA, supra note 18, s 3 (“embryos”).

33

See Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30.

34

See Royal Commission on NRTs, supra note 20.

35

See Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30; AHRA,
supra note 18, s 2(f).
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Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta dealt with the question
of whether a woman (C.C.) could have access to embryos
created through her eggs and the sperm of a friend (A.W.).
A.W. did not, however, consent to the release of the
embryos. The court held that the sperm was a gift and that
the remaining embryos were C.C.’s property. The court
wrote “they are chattels that can be used as [C.C.] sees
fit.”36
In another case, J.C.M. v A.N.A., the Supreme Court
of British Columbia dealt with a dispute between two
women over thirteen sperm straws that the couple had
purchased in the United States.37 The court relied on A.W.
v C.C. and the United Kingdom case of Yearworth v North
Bristol NHS Trust in which the court had stated that:
“developments in medical science now require a reanalysis of the common law’s treatment of and approach to
the issue of ownership of parts or products of a living
human body, whether for present purposes (viz. an action
in negligence) or otherwise.”38 In J.C.M. v A.N.A., Justice
Russell found that the sperm had been treated as property
by the donor, the gamete agency, the clinic, and the parties.
Since the parties had divided all their joint assets when
their relationship ended, it followed that the sperm straws
should be divided as well. Given the uneven number,
J.C.M. got seven, A.N.A. got six, and J.C.M. had to pay
A.N.A. for the value of the extra sperm straw.

36

See CC v AW, 2005 ABQB 290 at para 21.

37

See JCM v ANA, 2012 BCSC 584 [JCM].

38

Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust, [2009] EWCA Civ 37 at para
45(a).
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In other Canadian cases, outside the context of
disputes between couples or friends, judges have also faced
the issue of whether reproductive material is property. In
Lam v British Columbia, Justice Butler of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia dealt with the issue of whether
sperm could be categorized as property for the purpose of
provincial legislation dealing with the storage of goods.39
Howard Lam was the representative of a class of 400
cancer patients who had stored sperm in a freezer in an
andrology lab at the University of British Columbia as a
preventive measure in case their cancer radiation
treatments affected their reproductive potential. An
electrical problem with the freezer resulted in damage to
the sperm. The patients sued for negligence. Justice Butler
held that the sperm was in fact property for the purposes of
the provincial legislation. More recently, in K.L.W. v
Genesis Fertility Centre Justice Pearlman of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia dealt with the question of
whether K.L.W.’s late husband’s sperm was her legal
property. Even though her husband (A.B.) had not
consented in writing to K.L.W. using his sperm if he died,
there was evidence from a number of witnesses that
suggested that he wanted his wife to be able to use the
sperm to conceive in the event that he died.40 Justice
Pearlman held that the sperm was K.L.W.’s legal property.
In other jurisdictions, like the United States, courts have
dealt with the issue of what to do with embryos in the
context of disputes through reliance on a weighing of rights

39

See Lam v University of British Columbia, 2013 BCSC 2094 at para
68.

40

See KLW v Genesis Fertility Centre, 2016 BCSC 1621 at para 132.

TREATING EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY

333

approach in some cases,41 but largely through clinic
consent forms,42 property law,43 or a combination of the
latter two approaches.44
Despite the growing trend in Canada, and in other
jurisdictions, to rely on property law, consent forms, or
some combination of the two to manage these disputes, the
Superior Court decision of S.H. v D.H. was the cause of
much public media debate from Canadian lawyers,
academics, and the general public.45 The most common
41

See Davis v Davis, 842 SW (2d) 588 (Tenn 1992); In Re Marriage of
Witten, 672 NW (2d) 768 (Iowa 2003) [Witten]; AZ v BZ, 725 NE (2d)
1051 (Mass Sup Jud Ct 2000); Human Embryo #4 HB-A v Vergara,
US Dist LEXIS 136782 (La E Dist Ct, 2017).

42

See Kass v Kass, 696 NE (2d) 174, 673 NYS (2d) 350, 91 NY (2d) 554
(App Ct 1998) [Kass]; In Re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 194 P (3d)
834, 222 Or App 572 (1998); Roman v Roman, 193 SW (3d) 40 (Tex
Ct App 2006); Litowitz v Litowitz, 48 P (3d) 261 (Wash Sup Ct 2002);
JB v MB, 751 A (2d) 613 (NJ Sup Ct 2001) [JB].

43

See York v Jones, 717 F Supp 421 (Va Dist Ct 1989]; Witten, supra
note 41.

44

See e.g. Kass, supra note 42; JB, supra note 42.

45

See e.g. Stefanie Carsley, “Who has control over frozen embryos after
a divorce?”, The Globe and Mail (13 August 2018), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-who-has-control-overfrozen-embryos-after-divorce/> [Carsley, “Who Has Control”];
Gabrielle Giroday, “Judge says Sudbury woman can use embryo after
legal fight with ex-husband”, Canadian Lawyer Magazine (30 July
2018),
online:
<www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/author/gabriellegiroday/judge-says-sudbury-woman-can-use-embryo-after-legalfight-with-ex-husband-16035/>; Alana Cattapan, “Who gets the frozen
embryos in the divorce?”, The Conversation (8 August 2018), online:
<theconversation.com/who-gets-the-frozen-embryos-in-the-divorce101022>.
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critique of the case, among scholars and lawyers alike, is
that it categorized embryos as property. Although it was
overturned, it seems likely, based on recent trends, that this
conceptualization of embryos as property will arise in other
disputes. I use this juncture as an opportunity to assess
whether the concerns over the Superior Court’s decision to
label embryos as property are warranted.
In this paper I employ a feminist relational analysis
of autonomy in order to analyze the implications of
categorizing embryos as property, like Justice Del Frate did
in S.H. v D.H. In Part I of this paper, I examine the notion
that property is symbolic of autonomy. I argue that this
understanding of property is flawed because property has a
strong relational component. Categorizing something, like
an embryo, as property has implications for people’s
relationships with others and with society. We can only
understand the true effect of categorizing embryos as
property by looking at what it means for these
relationships. A feminist relational theory of autonomy
allows us to examine these implications in consideration of
the social, cultural, and historical factors that play into
people’s relationships.
In Part II, I employ a feminist relational theory of
autonomy to analyze three major relationships that will be
affected by categorizing embryos as property. I identify
these to be: (1) the relationship between cisgendered
heterosexual intended parents, (2) the relationship between
intended mothers, the embryo, and society, and (3) the
relationship between intended parent(s) and an egg donor
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and/or surrogate.46 I focus on relationships involving
cisgender women.47 I do so because of cisgender women’s
unique (and large) role in reproduction, given that they
carry and birth a baby,48 and their role in the process of
creating an embryo is more time-consuming and invasive
than that of cisgender men. I additionally focus on
cisgender women because of the important role that
46

Two other important relationships, that were beyond the scope of this
article, are: (1) the relationships between intended parents and children,
and (2) the relationship between egg donors, surrogates, and children
conceived through donor oocytes and/or carried by a surrogate. I chose
not to look at these two relationships for two reasons. Firstly, Jennifer
Nedelsky explored the relationship between intended parents and
children in her article. See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Property in Potential
Life? A Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories” (1993)
6:2 Can JL & Jur 343 at 343 [Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life”].
Secondly, the focus of this paper is on the effects, of categorizing
embryos as property, for cisgender women. An analysis of the effects
of categorizing embryos as property on the relationship between
intended parents, egg donors, surrogates, and children ends up largely
being about how the categorization affects the child born from the
embryo, rather than about how it affects cisgender women.

47

In this paper I refer to cisgender women. I acknowledge that my
arguments do not apply to/reflect the reality of all cisgender women.
However, I use this category because it still has significance in our
world. It denotes a structural position. Power is still clustered around
and exercised against this category. See Kimberlé Crenshaw,
“Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence against Women of Color” (1991) 43:6 Stan L Rev 1241 at
1297 [Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”]. See also Lena Gunnarsson,
“A Defence of the Category ‘Women’” (2011) 12:1 Feminist Theory
23 at 23.

48

Second-wave feminist writer Shulamith Firestone, for example, argued
that women’s unique role with regard to reproduction is the basis of
gender inequality. See Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The
case for the Feminist Revolution (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970).
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property has played in the oppression of people gendered
as women.49
Ultimately, I come to the following conclusions
about the effects, of categorizing embryos as property, on
the three relationships I identified involving cisgender
women. First, taking into account how characterizing
embryos as property will interact with social, cultural, and
historical contexts, I find that categorizing embryos as
property adds to an alarming power imbalance between
cisgendered heterosexual intended parents when they are
separating and trying to make decisions about what to do
with frozen embryos. This leads me to concur with an
argument, put forward by Stefanie Carsley, that
categorizing embryos as property could increase the
possibility that embryos will be used as a bargaining tool,
to cisgender women’s detriment, when couples are
dividing property.50 In light of these inequalities, between
cisgender men and cisgender women in the division of
embryos, embryos should be divided in favour of women.
Secondly, there are compelling reasons that categorizing
embryos as property could perpetuate the idea that
cisgender women’s bodies are ownable. Particularly in the
context of transnational surrogacy and egg donation,
categorizing embryos as property could create a domino
effect whereby egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies, which
enable the creation of this “property,” are viewed as
commodities. These are views that could have the effect of
perpetuating
the
long-term
oppression
and
disempowerment of cisgender women. If the trend towards
49

I discuss this in more detail in Part II of this paper.

50

Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30.
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treating embryos as property continues to grow, a feminist
reconceptualization of property, such as that proposed by
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, would be an important, albeit
slow, step to alter notions that cisgender women can be
owned or commoditized.51
This paper follows the lead of Professor Susan B.
Boyd whose work advocates that we question the often
unquestioned gendered impact of different legal and policy
choices, and how factors such as race and class intersect
with this impact.52 It seeks to respond to her call for more
work that uses a feminist paradigm to reveal ongoing and
shifting relations of power. 53 This paper is in conversation
with Jennifer Nedelsky who argued that the best way to
reflect on our choice of a legal category is to examine how
that legal category structures relationships.54 Nedelsky
looked at three American cases where embryos were
treated by the parties as property, and she explored the
ramifications of this for “[r]elationships of respect and
51

See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, “The Body as Property: A Feminist
Re-vision” in Faye D Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp, eds, Conceiving the
New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995) 387.

52

See e.g. Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work (Don
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003).

53

In this case, I seek to reveal the way that categorizations of embryos as
property impacts power relations. See e.g. Susan B Boyd, “Spaces and
Challenges: Feminism in Legal Academia” (2011) 44:1 UBC L Rev
205.

54

See Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life”, supra note 46 at 343;
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self,
Autonomy, and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)
[Nedelsky, Law’s Relations].
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appreciation for children.”55 I build on her work by
hypothesizing about the implications for three other
relationships (involving cisgender women) that could be
affected by categorizing embryos as property.56
PART I: THE RELATIONAL COMPONENT OF
PROPERTY
Beginning with the oldest theories of property, property
has been seen as a symbol of autonomy. In Chapter V,
Essay Two, of “Two Treatises of Government,” John
Locke explains how initially the world belongs to everyone
in common. However, every individual is entitled to take
some of the common property and make it their own
legitimate private property. They do so by mixing labour—
their own, or that of someone they employed—into land or

55

Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life”, supra note 46 at 355.

56

See ibid at 343, 346–51, 355. In addition to “[r]elationships of respect
and appreciation of children,” Nedelsky identified two other
relationships that she thought would be affected by designating
embryos as property. These are: (1) “[r]elationships of respect for
women and honouring of their reproductive capacities and labour,” and
(2) “[r]elations of equality, between people of all classes and
backgrounds as well as between men and women” (at 355). Nedelsky’s
second category of relationships reflects my own second category of
relationships. However, whilst Nedelsky discusses possible concerns
about exploitation, commodification and alienation of women’s bodies
(at 346–51), she does not explicitly look at these from a relational
perspective, which is what I do here. Nedelsky’s third category of
relationship could encompass the relationship between heterosexual
couples and the relationships between intended parents and their
surrogate or egg donor. However, she does not discuss these two types
of relationships.
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other natural resources.57 “That labour,” writes Locke, “put
a distinction between them and common. That added
something more to them than Nature, the common mother
of all, had done, and so they became his private right.”58
Locke justifies the right to possess objects outside one’s
self through the idea of self-ownership. He writes, “every
man has a ‘property’ in his own Person. This nobody has
any right to but himself. The ‘labour’ of his body and the
‘work’ of his hands we may say, are properly his.”59 Since
we own our labour, and are mixing this labour to something
in nature, the result becomes our property. In Locke’s
theory, people have, or should have, private property
rights. As private owners, people have the “right to possess,
the right to use, the right to manage, the right to income of
the thing, the right to the capital,”60 and so on. Locke is
suggesting that property comprises a private sphere that
people have full autonomy over. Legitimate government
should, as its goal, protect rights, such as this private sphere
of people’s property rights.61

57

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government: Second Treatise, Rod Hay,
ed (London: Printed for Thomas Tegg; W Sharpe & Son; G Offor;
Gand J Robinson; J Evans & Co; R. Griffin & Co Glasgow & J
Gumming,
Dublin)
at
115,
online
(pdf):
<www.yorku.ca/comninel/courses/3025pdf/Locke.pdf>.

58

Ibid at 116.

59

Ibid.

60

See AM Honoré, Making Law Bind Essays Legal and Philosophical
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 161 at 370 for a full list.

61

See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts
and Possibilities” (1989) 1 Yale JL & Feminism 7 at 17 [Nedelsky,
“Reconceiving Autonomy”].
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Feminism and Autonomy
This premise that property defines an autonomous sphere,
however, is problematic because autonomy itself is flawed.
The concept of autonomy has been critiqued heavily,
particularly in feminist literature. Critics of autonomy
argue that while the concept does not need to be thrown out
completely, it needs immense reconceptualization.
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar have
helpfully categorized critiques of historical and
contemporary conceptions of autonomy into five
categories.62 The first critique has been led by scholars like
Lorraine Code. Code’s focus is on the character ideal of the
“autonomous man”, which she argues has been very
influential in Western culture.63 This depiction is that of the
man envisioned by Locke who has his own private space
within his property and leads a self-sufficient, independent
life. This ideal is detrimental because it prioritizes
independence over other values, like caring, friendship and
responsibility, and treats communities that emphasize these
values as problematic. It is also a flawed depiction of
persons because it ignores the fact that people become
people in relation to others—we are not solely independent
beings.64 Mackenzie and Stoljar label the second grouping
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63

Lorraine Code, What Can She Know?: Feminist Theory and the
Construction of Knowledge (New York: Cornell University Press,
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of critiques as metaphysical.65 The main argument of these
metaphysical critiques is that we have developed a theory
of autonomy on the assumption that people are atomistic
and individualistic. However, people are not individualistic
in the way that individualistic has traditionally been
defined. Rather, people are socially embedded. Thus, our
conceptualization of autonomy is based on an error. The
third set of criticisms are care critiques. These relate to
Lorraine
Code’s
argument
that
traditional
conceptualizations of autonomy have valued independence
and self-sufficiency over interconnection and dependence.
Relations of dependence and interconnection, however, are
central to cisgender women’s lives and are associated with
cis and heteronormative femininity. Thus, traditional
conceptions of autonomy that prefer independence and
self-sufficiency devalue cisgender women’s experiences.66
Fourth are the criticisms that the authors lump into a
category called postmodernist critiques. These critics argue
that ideals of autonomy that assume that people are
psychically unified and self-aware are false.67 Jean
Grimshaw, for instance, draws on Freud’s psychoanalytic
theory to illustrate that people are in fact conflict-ridden.68
Critics argue that those ideals of autonomy that assume a
pure Kantian true self or free will ignore the fact that people
are “constituted within and by regimes, discourses, and
65
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Press, 1988) 90 at 102–03.
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micropractices of power.”69 There is no one universal
notion of autonomy. Autonomy is different for different
people because it is based on people’s different historical,
social, and cultural contexts. The final critiques are
diversity critiques. These critics argue that everyone’s
identities reflect the multiple groups to which they belong
and the ways that these identities (for example: gender,
race, class, to name a few) interact.70 These multiple
dimensions of identity cannot be explained as either/or
propositions.
For instance, Kimberlé Crenshaw explains that
when speaking of women of colour, we cannot explain
their identity as “woman” or “person of colour.”71
Crenshaw developed the theory of intersectionality in order
to understand the ways that these grounds of identity
interact to shape the multiple dimensions of people’s
experiences in different contexts. Specifically, Crenshaw
employed intersectionality to look at the ways that multiple
forms of inequality compound themselves, such as in
violence against women of colour72 and Black women’s
employment experiences.73 Theories of autonomy assume
a sense of integrated self; theories of intersectionality,
where the self might not be fully integrated, do not fit with
69
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such theories of autonomy.74 At the heart of all of these
critiques is that traditional individual autonomy is
individualistic, overly simplistic, and inherently cis and
heteronormatively masculine. It ignores the relational
component of people’s lives and the fact that people’s
actions are embedded in their historical, social, and cultural
contexts.
What this means for property is that when an
embryo, for instance, is categorized as property, we might
assume, based on traditional theories of property, that the
property owner has autonomy over it and acts
independently in what they do with it. However, because
people are inextricably bound up in their relationships and
in their historical, social, and cultural contexts, the ways
that people control their property is not autonomous and is
affected by their context and by other people. Secondly,
because we are not autonomous beings separated from
society and from our social relationships, getting property
rights in something creates new relationships and impacts
our relationships with other people and society. To look at
this in any other way would be to ignore the importance of
society and relationships, particularly for cisgender
women. This way of thinking is also in line with common
law jurisprudence which views property as a set of
relationships between people with different bundles of
sticks of rights, rather than as a relationship with the
thing.75
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Relational Theory of Autonomy
A relational theory of autonomy helps us understand the
ways that people, context (social, cultural, and historical),
and social determinants (race, class, gender and ethnicity)
are implicated in our relationships with property. A
relational theory of autonomy is the feminist reconfiguring
of individual autonomy that adds the relational concept of
the self. As I mentioned earlier in this paper, Jennifer
Nedelsky advocated that we should reflect on our choice of
legal categories through examining how they structure
relationships.76 Nedelsky was also the first person to
articulate a feminist account of relational autonomy.77
Since then, a large number of feminist scholars have
employed relational theory across different disciplines.
Each of these authors has worked with and articulated
relational theory in different ways. The common concern
of these different authors is to use relational theory to
uncover how oppression seeps into people’s decisions,
actions, and relationships with others.
The relational theory that I draw on here finds its
roots in liberalism, communitarianism, and feminism.78
“The image of humans as self-determining creatures . . .
remains one of the most powerful dimensions of liberal
thought.”79 Relational theory, however, rejects the
76

See Nedelsky, Law’s Relations, supra note 54.
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individualism inherent in the idea that people are selfdetermining. It recognizes that people are socially
embedded, and that people, context, and social
determinants affect the self.80 This is where relational
theory draws on communitarianism, which acknowledges
the way that community relationships mould people’s
identities and personalities.81 Finally, I draw on feminism
because of the historic significance of relationships in
cisgender women’s lives.
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir famously
argues that women are not seen and defined as themselves,
but through their relation to others.82 In particular,
cisgender women are defined and differentiated with
reference to men.83 Men, on the other hand, can think of
themselves without women. More recently, Carol Gilligan
argued that not only are cisgender women’s identities
formed and sustained through relationships with others, but
cisgender women’s “moral voices” are also centered on
relationships and responding to others in caring ways.84
Thus, the relationships created through characterizing
embryos as property are likely to be more important to
cisgender women and their identities, as cisgender women
80
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not only have a unique relationship with reproduction, but
also have identities in which relationships have always
played a significant part.
In examining the possible relationships that might
be implicated by characterizing embryos as property, I
acknowledge that the ways that this characterization
implicates these relationships will depend on people,
context, and social determinants. My use of a relational
theory of autonomy involves looking at each of these
relationships within their social, cultural, and historical
contexts. Like many of the relational theory scholars before
me, I pay close attention to how the oppression of cisgender
women plays into these relationships.
PART II: A RELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
RELATIONSHIPS IMPLICATED IN
CATEGORIZING EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY
If we think about how and for whom in vitro embryos are
created, their intended use, and their special status in
society, there is a long list of relationships that could be
affected by categorizing embryos as property. These
include the relationship between two (or more) intended
parents who create the embryo, intended parent(s) and
gamete donors, intended parent(s) and surrogates, intended
parent(s) and the embryo, intended parent(s) and society,
the clinic and/or agency and gamete donors, the clinic
and/or agency and surrogates, etc. In this section, I employ
a relational theory of autonomy to explore how
characterizing embryos as property will interact with
social, cultural and historical contexts and what this will
mean for the relationships involved. The first relationship
that I explore is that between cisgendered heterosexual

TREATING EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY

347

intended parents. The second is the relationship between
intended mothers and the embryo itself, and the
implications for intended mothers’ relationship with
society. The third is a relationship that arises when an egg
donor or surrogate is used and it is the relationship between
intended parent(s) and the egg donor and/or surrogate.
The Relationship between Cisgendered Heterosexual
Intended Parents
I begin by focusing on the relationship between
cisgendered heterosexual intended parents and how
characterizing embryos as property could affect their
relationship in light of social, cultural, and historical
factors. It is when couples are separating and trying to
decide what to do with frozen embryos that this
characterization could have the biggest effect on the
relationship.
Characterizing embryos as property means that
embryos can be divided between couples like all other
property of the relationship. The first way that
characterizing embryos as property could affect intended
parents’ relationships is that it could cause disputes
between couples who are breaking up, where otherwise
there might not have been a dispute.85 In these disputes,
embryos might be competed over.86 This is a concern
because of the long history of power imbalances between
cisgendered heterosexual women and men when it comes
to property rights. Historically, English common law rules
85
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that were brought to Canada left women with little or no
rights when it came to property.87 When women were
married, they lost their separate existence. Their person and
any property, including wages, were absorbed by their
husbands.88 Although married women did not lose
ownership of their real estate, they lost the right to manage
and receive profits from it to their husbands.89 They were
also “incapable of contracting, of suing, or of being sued in
their own names.”90 Husbands thus had control over
women’s lives through managing their property, money,
87
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and rights. Canadian legislation with regard to women’s
property rights has since been reformed. However,
imbalances with regard to property rights remain a problem
in many jurisdictions around the world.91 These imbalances
in power, when it comes to property rights, have a social
element just as much as a legal element. While the laws in
Canada have changed, this does not mean that the socioculture of imbalance, when it comes to property rights,
have disappeared. A socio-culture of imbalance might still
permeate heterosexual couples’ disputes over property.
Property law has also been used to marginalize
groups of people on the basis of race, ethnicity, and class.
Racialized people have not only been denied property
rights, but have been treated as property throughout
history. Cheryl Harris argues that “[t]he origins of property
rights in the United States are rooted in racial
domination.”92 Harris is among a number of scholars who
have written on how the concepts of race and property have
been used to subordinate certain groups of people on the
basis of race.93 Writing from the American context, Patricia
91
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J. Williams draws a link between the perspective of a wild
fox (in Pierson v Post) being pursued by a hunter and his
hounds, and the experience of her great-great grandmother,
who was a slave owned by a man named Austin Miller.94
The similarity between her great-great grandmother and
the fox was that they were both a form of property—“either
owned or unowned, never the owner.”95 In either situation,
the subjects were never given the rights to themselves.96 In
the Canadian context, historian Barrington Walker
describes how property law was integral in maintaining the
system of slavery in Canada, and is still used to maintain
social inequality today.97 Even where the law has
improved, as with the area of gender, the social elements
of these imbalances persist. Thus, race, ethnicity, and class
also play into power imbalances experienced by cisgender
women in property disputes, making it such that these
The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of
Conquest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also Kathleen
Jamieson, Indian Women and the Law in Canada: Citizens Minus
(Ottawa: Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1978);
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94
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imbalances might be especially pronounced for racialized
women.
The power imbalance between cisgender women
and men is exacerbated by a number of factors that make
embryos possibly more valuable to cisgender women than
to cisgender men. Firstly, as Stefanie Carsley, Christine
Overall, Roxanne Mytiuk, and Albert Wallrap point out,
cisgender women play a much larger biological role in
creating embryos than men.98 Men’s contribution to
creating an in vitro embryo involves ejaculating into a cup.
The process is relatively easy and straightforward. For
cisgender women, on the other hand, the process is
invasive, time-consuming, and can be quite painful. It
involves drug regimes, surgery, and anesthesia.99 The
process entails side effects that range from nausea and
bloating to ovarian hyper-stimulation syndrome.100 In the
long-term, stimulation may cause or accelerate certain
types of cancer, such as breast and ovarian cancer,101 and
might pose risks to future fertility, although there are a lot
98
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of uncertainties because of a lack of long-term risk
assessment.102 Second, cisgender women’s fertility seems
to decline more rapidly than men’s fertility, meaning there
is a greater likelihood that cisgender women’s eggs will
become unviable at an earlier age than men’s sperm.103
There are also risks associated with retrieving eggs
at a later stage. While these issues are not applicable in the
case of neither member of the couple being a genetic
contributor, there are risks for cisgender women of
delaying child-bearing.104 Thirdly, in vitro fertilization
(IVF) is a costly process. Only Ontario offers public
funding for IVF; however, there is a limited amount
offered, and it is not offered to women above the age of
forty-two. Cisgender women, more often than cisgender
men, do not work outside the home. When cisgender
102
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women do work outside the home they are paid lower
salaries.105 The cost of paying for IVF again, and possibly
paying for semen donation, is high. As such, IVF might be
less accessible to women than it is for men. Fourthly,
scholars such as Kristin Park have documented the stigma
experienced by individuals who choose not to have
children.106 There is an expectation of cisgender women,
more so than of cisgender men, to become parents.
As Rosemary Gillespie observes, “constructions of
[cis and heteronormative] femininity and women’s social
role have historically and traditionally been contextualized
around the practices and symbolism surrounding
motherhood.”107 Motherhood is seen as “natural” and
expected for cisgender women, and central to cis and
heteronormative femininity.108 Gillespie argues that she is
hopeful that discourses are starting to shift such that cis and
heteronormative femininity is no longer conflated with
motherhood. However, pronatalist discourses and
105
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discourses that denigrate voluntarily childless cisgender
women do still persist. Thus, cisgender women may feel as
though they have to have children and may worry about
experiencing stigma if they do not. This might make the
embryos more valuable to cisgender women if they think
the embryos might be their only chance at motherhood.
Stefanie Carsley points out that across the case law in
various jurisdictions, it is generally women who are
seeking to use the embryos. There is only one example of
a case where a woman withdrew her consent.109 Carsley’s
article was written prior the S.H. v D.H. case, but of course
S.H. v D.H. joins the list of cases whereby the woman
partner wished to use the embryo and her male partner
withdrew consent. This suggests that cisgender women
might want the embryos more badly than men.
This leads to the second problem, which is that
given these power imbalances and the fact that embryos are
possibly more valuable to cisgender women than cisgender
men, embryos might be used as a bartering tool.110
Cisgender women might have to exchange more of other
property in exchange for the embryos.
It is of course possible that treating embryos as
property might not lead to more disputes, and that embryos
might be split equally between the parties. However, the
history of power imbalances between cisgender men and
cisgender women indicates otherwise. This might be
particularly true for racialized cisgender women. In this
situation—one in which cisgender women’s bigger
109
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physical contribution to creating embryos, faster fertility
decline, possible inability to pay for more IVF, and societal
expectations that cisgender women have children come
into play—it seems likely that embryos could become a
bargaining chip.111 Cisgender women could be taken
advantage of. As Michelle Sublett suggests, if embryos are
treated as property, the court or legislature need to develop
some sort of guidelines for distribution.112 Perhaps these
guidelines might need to be that embryos are considered to
be a special form of property that always needs to be split
equally, as in the sperm straws of J.C.M. v A.N.A.
Alternatively, embryos should perhaps be split in favour of
cisgender women.
The Relationship Between Intended Mothers, the
Embryo, and Society
The second relationship that I investigate is the relationship
between intended mothers and the embryo itself, if the
embryo is considered as property. Much of this section,
however, focuses on what categorizing embryos as
property could mean for intended mothers’ relationship
with society, and how intended mothers might be viewed
by society.
From a relational viewpoint, it is possible that
treating embryos as property could be beneficial for
intended mothers’ relationship with embryos, and
relationship with society. As I stated earlier, it is clear from
111
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Canadian law that embryos are not human beings in
Canada since they are less developed than fetuses, which
Canadian case law has confirmed are not persons.113
Treating embryos as people would not only not be in sync
with Canada’s emphasis on cisgender women’s procreative
liberty, but could also jeopardize it.114 In fact, a number of
scholars115 argue that it is even harmful to cisgender
women, and their rights, to place too much concentration
on respect for the embryo in guidelines and statutes on
embryo research, storage, donation, etcetera.116 The
embryo is created through an invasive and large
contribution by cisgender women, and as Isabel Karpin
points out “the embryo is only connected with its potential
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for personhood by female embodiment.”117 When we argue
that all embryos are of equal value, we ignore the important
role of cisgender women in creating these embryos and
also the fact that cisgender women are necessary for these
embryos to become human. Jenni Millbank, whose focus is
on embryo disposition laws in Australia, argues that the
special status accorded to embryos created through the IVF
process means that the cisgender women who create these
embryos “disappear” or become an afterthought, even
though it is their desire for children and their labor that
create the embryos to begin with.118
In the Canadian context, Maneesha Deckha
investigates whether the “respect” and “dignity” accorded
to embryos by the AHRA risks jeopardizing support for
abortion.119 Ultimately she finds that it is possible for
feminists to promote respect and dignity of embryos while
still maintaining a pro-choice stance. However, Deckha
argues that there is a real concern that among the general
public the AHRA will promote rhetoric of “respect” and
“dignity” for embryos.120 The public might not look into
the AHRA in enough detail to see that it was developed in
such a way so that people can abide by the AHRA and
respect embryos, and also respect cisgender women’s
procreative choice at the same time. Deckha’s argument
confirms Millbank’s suggestion that when laws emphasize
117

Isabel Karpin, “The Uncanny Embryos: Legal Limits to the Human
and Reproduction Without Women” (2006) 28:4 Sydney L Rev 599 at
603.

118

See Millbank, supra note 115.

119

See Deckha, “Legislating Respect”, supra note 115.

120

See ibid.

358

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019]

the respect and dignity of embryos, this can take the
limelight and cisgender women are overlooked. For
Deckha this means cisgender women’s procreative liberty
is overlooked, whereas for Millbank and Karpin this means
that cisgender women’s labor in creating and carrying
embryos is overlooked.
Donna Dickenson takes this a step further. She
argues that not only does cisgender women’s reproductive
labor get overlooked, but that cisgender women’s
reproductive labor has never been considered real labor
that would entitle cisgender women to ownership rights in
the products of their labor.121 This, Dickenson argues, is
consistent with most of cisgender women’s labor, which
has rarely been recognized as labor and has never given
cisgender women the same rights that, in liberal theory, it
would give to men.122 Dickenson suggests that since
property comes from the labor of cisgender women’s
bodies, the labor that cisgender women put into the process
of creating an embryo through IVF qualifies as labor in a
Lockean sense and should entitle cisgender women to
property rights in embryos.123 Treating embryos as
property would be a way to finally recognize cisgender
women’s reproductive labor as legitimate labor and to
recognize cisgender women’s right to ownership over the
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products of this labor.124 Dickenson is careful to point out
that treating embryos as property would not mean that
cisgender women own their bodies, but only that cisgender
women own the objects resulting from their labor.
Dickenson argues that maintaining this distinction ensures
that we avoid objectification or commodification of
cisgender women’s bodies.125
Although recognizing embryos as property could
possibly mean that cisgender women’s role in creating
embryos is not overlooked and their labor is finally
recognized as such, a further relational analysis reveals that
the categorization of embryos as property can have a
possible detrimental impact on cisgender women’s
relationship with embryos and society. First, the property
rights that these scholars anticipate cisgender women
getting in embryos are based on Locke’s theory. I have
already pointed out that this theory is flawed. The
autonomous control that these scholars anticipate that
cisgender women might get over embryos, if they are
characterized as property, does not reflect reality.
Second, treating embryos as property implies that
we have these property rights because we own the labor
that created them. Traditionally, we own our labor because
we own our bodies that performed this labor. Farida Akhter
argues that “[a] woman is naturally in command over her
body. She is by nature in possession of herself.”126 When
124
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cisgender women think of themselves as owners of their
bodies, cisgender women are creating a “new social
relationship” to this natural power.127 This is a social
relationship which denies that cisgender women’s
reproductive capacity is a natural power. It turns cisgender
women’s bodies into a reproductive factory and objectifies
them. In The Sexual Contract, Carole Pateman argues that
thinking of ourselves as owners of our bodies overlooks the
fact that ourselves are inextricably linked to our bodies.128
In saying that we own our labor, and thus our bodies, we
are conceptualizing these as distinct from our “self”, when
in actuality cisgender women’s body and reproductive
labor are part of their “self”.129
Suggesting that cisgender women have ownership
in their bodies has also been contested by radical feminists.
This rhetoric of “control” and “property” when it comes to
cisgender women’s bodies evokes a history of patriarchal
practices of objectifying and gaining access to cisgender
women’s bodies, for instance through medical science and
population-control agencies.130 Farida Akhter argues that
we live in a society based on private property where
International Conference hosted in Bard, Kotbari, Comilla, 1989) at
10,
online
(pdf):
FINNRAGE
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cisgender women are owned by men as a means of
production of the human species.131 Carole Pateman argues
that the means through which “patriarchy is constituted” is
through the contracts of property that people hold in
themselves.132 In the classic texts (other than Hobbes),
however, only men have the necessary characteristics to
enter into contracts, and so cisgender women are never
parties to the contract and are only ever the subject. The
sexual contract is the way in which men use their natural
right over cisgender women and secure “patriarchal civil
right.”133 These contracts lead to the exploitation of
cisgender women, because in such a contract one person is
subordinate to the other. Pateman argues that when
cisgender women speak of bodily ownership they implicate
themselves in “masculine contractarian fictions,” meaning
that they reinforce the idea that bodies, and especially
cisgender women’s bodies, are ownable.134 By virtue of
being able to be owned, cisgender women’s bodies are
reduced to commodities. Commoditizing cisgender
women’s bodies brings about its own set of concerns,
which I address in further detail in the next section when
talking about the effect of categorizing embryos as
property on intended parents’ relationships with egg
donors and surrogates.
Thus, a relational analysis of the implications of
characterizing embryos as property on intended mothers’
relationship with the embryo and society, reveals that it is
131
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possible for characterizing embryos as property to mean
that we no longer overlook cisgender women’s role in
creating and carrying embryos, and that cisgender
women’s reproductive labor is seen as real labor. However,
social, historical, and cultural context point strongly
towards the idea that cisgender women would not get the
property rights in embryos that they anticipate.
Importantly, cisgender women having a property right in
embryos implies that cisgender women own their labor,
and they own their labor because they own their bodies.
Notions of self-ownership intrude on cisgender women’s
natural command over their body, implicate cisgender
women’s selves in ownership, and open the door to the idea
that cisgender women’s bodies are ownable. The biggest
concern is the latter. The link between characterizing
embryos as property and this idea that cisgender women’s
bodies are ownable might be tenuous. However, it is still
plausible and would be highly oppressive.
Cisgender women owning their labor, however,
does not have to bring us back to histories of men owning
cisgender women. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky argues that
we need to “recuperate the notion of self-propriety as an
indispensable part of feminist conceptions of social
democracy and even property more generally.”135 Our
understanding of what it means to have self-ownership
comes down to how we understand property in general. All
too often, property, ownership, and self-ownership are
interpreted in historical paradigms of property—most
commonly a Lockean paradigm. There are two major
problems with that. Firstly, a Lockean paradigm of
property draws a sharp distinction between the body as a
135
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commodity, and the person as a transactor.136 It does not
consider that there may not be a definite dualism between
the two things. Since Locke’s theory of property is based
on an individualist conception of social life, it does not
reveal the relationships involved in self-ownership. It also
sees self-ownership as purely instrumental towards owning
the products labored by people’s body. Second, viewing
self-ownership through a Lockean viewpoint has the effect
of putting property into economic terms and getting rid of
any cultural variation in property.
It is easy to get caught up in thinking that there is
only one idea of property, and that it needs to be economic.
As a relational view of property reveals, property itself is a
product of different social, cultural, and historical
circumstances and thus can vary in different contexts.137
We can see examples in history where ideas about owning
one’s body have less to do with property in an economic
sense and more to do with protecting one’s own sexuality
and personal security from arbitrary invasion. Petchesky
uses the example of Marilyn Strathern’s ethnographic
study of property relations among New Guinea
Highlanders.138 Strathern found that the New Guinea
Highland groups did not have the same notions of rights
over things, or even people, as in Western notions of
property. Among the Highlanders, ownership is a
136
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collective authority over resources
relationships of caretaking.139

and

involves

Donna Dickenson said that cisgender women’s
labor has never really fit into a Lockean perspective of
property.140 This is perhaps because as Petchesky suggests,
we need a rethinking of property altogether, that would be
more appropriate in the context of embryos. This would
involve creating a radical conception of property and
creating a feminist idea of bodily integrity.141 In order to
develop this, Petchesky argues that we can look at the
different approach to concepts like autonomy and selfownership that have been taken for instance by feminists
of color in the United States. A new underlying theory of
property would mean a different understanding of selfownership that might not have the same ramifications that
self-ownership has when viewed through a Lockean lens.
Given how common it is becoming to refer to embryos as
property, this might be a necessary way to ensure that we
rethink self-ownership.
The Relationship between Intended Parents, Egg
Donors, and Surrogates
In this third section, I pick up on some of the concerns
about intended mothers’ relationship with the embryo and
with society if we categorize embryos as property. I
explore how these concerns come into play when an egg
donor’s genetic material is used to create the embryo, and
139
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when a surrogate carries the embryo. I look generally at
what the characterization of embryos as property means for
the relationship between intended parents and egg donors,
and the relationship between intended parents and
surrogates.
As I mentioned in the last section, authors like
Donna Dickenson argue that treating embryos as property
could be a way to recognize cisgender women’s
reproductive labour.142 In the case of egg donors, this could
be a way to recognize their labour in producing eggs to
create the embryo. It might also call attention to the labour
performed by surrogates by saying that embryos are only
property until female embodiment enables them to become
persons.143 However, egg donors and surrogates do not get
the property rights that come with this labour. Egg donors
provide the eggs for embryos that become intended
parents’ property. Surrogates also do not own the efforts of
their labour. Since their labour produces a child, no one
owns the property rights since children are not ownable.
Intended parents, however, gain parental rights as a result
of surrogates’ labour.
In the context of disputes over reproductive
material, the focus is on the labour of the people whose
desire for a child created this embryo. For instance, in C.C.
v A.W. the court justifies that the sperm was a gift to C.C.
not only because A.W. knew what the sperm would be used
for, but also because C.C. badly wanted a baby, and put in
many years of labour trying to conceive with the sperm,
142
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143
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and had also paid to store the sperm.144 In J.C.M. v A.N.A.,
the sperm straws were the property of J.C.M. and A.N.A.
because they had chosen them and paid for them in their
efforts to have children.145 Research on surrogates and egg
donors indicates that this is the outcome that both groups
want: egg donors donate their eggs to help intended parents
produce an embryo and have children, and surrogates carry
an embryo so that intended parents can have children.146
Intended parents’ labour in seeking out gamete donors and
surrogates, paying for these services, and other efforts
entitle them to rights in the embryos and children.
The concern that this raises, however, is that if egg
donors and surrogates do not get rights in embryos and
children produced as products of their labour, who will be
perceived as owning their labour should embryos be
characterized as property? At best, egg donors and
surrogates own the labour themselves, which raises the
concern around self-ownership that I highlighted in the last
section. The larger concern is that egg donors’ and
surrogates’ labour will be seen to be owned by the intended
parents for whom they perform the labour. Generally, this
supports the idea that not only can cisgender women’s
bodies be owned, but also that they can be owned by people
other than themselves.

144
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Secondly, Carole Pateman and Jennifer Nedelsky
argue that owning the body reduces it to a commodity that
can be sold in the marketplace.147 For Carole Pateman it
does not matter whether egg donors and surrogates own
their body or intended parents own it. The mere fact of
owning it reduces it to a commodity.148 For intended
mothers, who use their own eggs and carry the child
themselves, it is problematic to create an image that their
bodies can be commodities. However, the reason I discuss
this commodification in this section on egg donors and
surrogates is that intended mothers are creating eggs and
carrying embryos for themselves so they are less likely to
perpetuate an idea that their bodies are commodities. Egg
donors and surrogates, on the other hand, perform this
work for intended parents and this labour is often bought
and sold. The idea that egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies
might be commoditized was a preoccupation of the Baird
Commission149—the Canadian body of commissioners
who were mandated to study and report on the broad
“social, ethical, health, research, legal and economic
implications” of assisted reproductive technologies
(including third party reproduction, like surrogacy and egg
donation).150 This was later manifested in the AHRA, which
in addition to dealing with embryos, also regulates egg
147
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donation and surrogacy. The AHRA prohibits paying for
surrogacy, gamete, and embryo donation151 in order to
prevent “trade in the reproductive capabilities of women
and men and the exploitation of children, women and
men.”152 However, we know that despite the legislation,
Canadians are paying for surrogacy and gametes in Canada
on a grey market, or they are going abroad.153 The fact that
many surrogates and egg donors are being paid in Canada
escalates this idea that if egg donors’ and surrogates’
bodies can be owned, they become commodities.
The first concern with egg donors’ and surrogates’
bodies being treated as commodities is that egg donors and
surrogates may become reduced to what they, or their
reproductive labour, can be exchanged for on the market.
Jyotsna Gupta, Annemiek Richters, Janice Raymond, and
Vandana Shiva argue that cisgender women become
151
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viewed solely as child-bearing machines or breeders.154
They become viewed as a means to an end rather than being
valued for their own intrinsic worth as human beings.155
Reducing cisgender women in this way further legitimizes
and enforces cisgender women’s gender oppression.
Treating cisgender women as commodities carries
connotations of chattel slavery,156 and trafficking in
persons. These examples have shown us the profound
moral reasons, like protecting human dignity, for ensuring
that people are never treated as commodities.157
When egg donors and surrogates are perceived as
commodities, this can lead to alienation from their bodies.
This has to do with the fact that when reproductive labour
is commoditized, we are taken further and further away
from the natural. Naomi Pfeffer argued that for cisgender
women undergoing IVF, the “mystique” of IVF conditions
makes the task more external and less natural, and thus it
154
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becomes more alienating.158 The same could be said when
egg donors’ and surrogates’ labour is commoditized. The
tasks of producing eggs and child-bearing, when the labour
is being performed under market conditions, could lead to
donors’ and surrogates’ alienation from these forms of
labour and from their bodies. Margaret Jane Radin argues
that through feeling this separation or lack of identity with
this form of labour, they will internalize the idea that they
as persons are separate from these unique forms of labour
they can perform.159 Cisgender women will experience the
pain of the divided self.160 Radin additionally argues that
even if cisgender women do not feel alienation from their
bodies, there is a lot of social disapproval connected with
commoditizing one’s body, and this in itself will
exacerbate oppression, making egg donors and surrogates
feel more alienated from society.161
When egg donors’ and surrogates’ reproductive
labour is seen as a commodity, there is also the possibility
that they will be unduly influenced or coerced into selling
this commodity. The argument is that cisgender women
might be so lured by payment that they will not, or might
be unable to, fully evaluate the risks of donating or acting
as a surrogate, and thus the consent that they provide might
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not be informed.162 Feminists such as Christine Overall
have argued that this concern is amplified for young, single
ethnic minority women of lower socioeconomic class.163
Scholars, such as Anita Allen, have expressed concern that
surrogacy and egg donation will become a new form of
racial and class discrimination and that minority cisgender
women will be specifically sought out to perform various
types of reproductive labour for middle and upper-class
intended parents.164
There is a lack of research on the experiences of
Canadian egg donors and surrogates. However, the body of
scholarship on the experiences of surrogates and egg
donors in other countries, that has been produced over the
last few decades, has helped to shed light on whether these
concerns (about surrogate and egg donors’ bodies being
treated as though they are owned by intended parents and
concerns related to their bodies being commoditized) are
warranted. The literature on egg donation reports on the
experience of donors in countries such as the United States,
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Canada, Finland, and the United Kingdom.165 This research
found that egg donors ranged in age from twenty to thirty165

See Almeling, supra note 146; Hammond, supra note 153; Monica
Konrad, Nameless Relations: Anonymity, Melanesia and Reproductive
Gift Exchange between British Ova Donors and Recipients (New York:
Berghan Books, 2005); Dorothy A Greenfeld et al, “Similarities and
differences between anonymous and directed candidates for oocyte
donation” (1995) 12:2 J Assist Reprod Genet 118; Jordan Caren,
Cynthia Belar & R Stan Williams, “Anonymous oocyte donation: A
follow-up analysis of donors’ experiences” (2004) 25:2 Journal of
Psychosomatic Obstetrics & Gynecology 145; Andrea L Kalfoglou &
Gail Geller, “A follow-up study with oocyte donors exploring their
experiences, knowledge, and attitudes about the use of their oocytes
and the outcome of the donation” (2000) 74:4 Fertility & Sterility 660;
Nancy J Kenney & Michelle L McGowan, “Looking back: egg donors’
retrospective evaluations of their motivations, expectations, and
experiences during their first donation cycle” (2010) 93:2 Fertility &
Sterility 455; Firouz Khamsi et al, “Some psychological aspects of
oocyte donation from known donors on altruistic basis” (1997) 68:2
Fertility & Sterility 323; Susan Caruso Klock, Andrea Mechanik
Braverman & Deidra Taylor Rausch, “Predicting anonymous egg
donor satisfaction: A preliminary study” (1998) 7:2 J Women’s Health
229; Sisan Caruso Klock, Jan Elman Stout & Marie Davidson,
“Psychological characteristics and factors related to willingness to
donate again among anonymous oocyte donors” (2003) 79 Fertil Steril
1312; Steven R Lindheim, Jennie Chase & Mark V Sauer, “Assessing
the influence of payment on motivations of women participating as
oocyte donors” (2001) 52:2 Gynecologic & Obstetric Investigation 89;
Matthew Patrick et al, “Anonymous oocyte donation: A follow-up
questionnaire” (2001) 75:5 Fertility & Sterility 1034; Mark V Sauer &
Richard J Paulson, “Oocyte donors: A demographic analysis of women
at the University of Southern California” (1992) 7:5 Human
Reproduction 726; LR Schover et al, “The psychological evaluation of
oocyte donors” (1990) 11:4 Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics &
Gynecology 299; Viveca Söderström-Anttila, “Follow-up study of
Finnish volunteer oocyte donors concerning their attitudes to oocyte
donation” (1995) 10:11 Human Reproduction 3073; Alanna Winter &
Judith C Daniluk, “A Gift From the Heart: The Experiences of Women

TREATING EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY

373

two, the majority are Caucasian, and a large number of
donors are of a low socioeconomic status, with many of
them being students.166
However, as Rene Almeling indicates through the
example of egg donor Megan, whilst money is a motivator,
the money is not usually so much that it makes donating
irresistible.167 In other words, the research on this topic
indicates that egg donors do not, generally, seem unduly
induced to donate. Egg donors’ overall description of egg
donation is that it is quick and easy but there are a wide
range of physical, psychological, and emotional risks
involved with donation, many of which egg donors
reported experiencing. For instance, egg donation raised
personal dilemmas for egg donors surrounding the
complicated set of relationships that result from
donation—such as between egg donors, intended parents,
and an offspring of the donation. Egg donors reported
feeling sometimes as though they were just a “means to an
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end.”168 This, and research that shows that some donors,
with particular backgrounds, are more sought out and/or
more highly compensated than others supports the notion
that egg donors might be treated as commodities, and
reduced to their monetary value.169 Research that has
looked at what exactly payment is for and the question of
whether it is for egg donors’ labour, or for their bodies, has
found that donors themselves seem to characterize
payment as being for the process of donation—time
injections, surgery, and/or risk, rather than for their
bodies.170
Karen Busby and Delaney Vun provide an
excellent review of the empirical literature on surrogacy
that was published at the time of writing the article.171 In
their review, they observe that surrogates are often young
(in their late twenties and early thirties) and Caucasian.172
Overwhelmingly, most surrogates do not have regrets
168
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about the process, they understand what they are agreeing
to, and they have a satisfying relationship with the intended
parents.173 A 2019 study, that was published after Busby
and Vun’s article, collected data on the experiences of 184
Canadian surrogates. It largely echoed these findings.174
The study found that most women reported a positive
experience, that relationships with intended parents played
a large role in this overall rating, and that for the most part
these were harmonious, or neutral. However, there were
some situations where surrogates and intended parents had
a conflictual relationship. For instance, “Surrogate 17”
reported feeling as though, as soon as she was pregnant, “it
was all about the baby.”175 Surrogate 38 found that the
intended mother she worked with was too invasive.176 The
comments of surrogate 17 reflect the concern of surrogates
being reduced to a means to an end. Surrogate 38’s
comment alludes to her possibly feeling alienated from her
body, that was being invaded by the intended mother. The
intended mother might also have been acting as though she
had ownership over surrogate 38’s body. Thus, whilst the
findings on surrogacy do not generally support concerns
173
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(2019)
Women
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about surrogates feeling commoditized, being reduced to
what they are exchanged for on the market, feeling
alienated from their bodies, and/or feeling unduly
influenced, there are some exceptions. There has been
insufficient research on the experiences of Canadian
surrogates to make an accurate assessment on just how
many exceptions there are.
The research that I have just recounted describes
the experience of domestic egg donors and surrogates.
There is also a transnational market in which Canadian
intended parents are traveling abroad for paid surrogacy
and egg donation and/or arranging for surrogates, egg
donors and eggs to come to Canada. There is limited
research on Canadians traveling abroad for surrogacy and
egg donation, but the research that exists confirms that it is
occurring.177 Concerns about egg donors and surrogates
being commoditized has been particularly pronounced in
the literature on cross-border reproductive care. Maneesha
Deckha points out that this is because the experience of
commodification is very different when egg donation and
surrogacy
is
happening
domestically
versus
178
transnationally. She goes on to argue that given how
popular transnational surrogacy has become, we need to
revisit earlier Westcentric feminist debates about
177
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commodification. They did not take into account
transnational surrogacy and the phenomenon of intended
parents traveling from the North to the global South for
surrogacy. Given the transnational North–South nature of
surrogacy, Deckha argues that we should employ a
“postcolonial feminist perspective” to guide research and
reform on surrogacy. When she speaks of a postcolonial
feminist perspective, she is referring to a “theoretical
framework that prioritizes the perspectives of women in the
Global South,” and challenges Western analyses including
those authored by Western feminists which “encode
colonial assumptions about the lives of non-Western
women and assume certain normative framings.”179
Although Deckha is speaking here about gestational
surrogacy, her arguments also apply to egg donation, as
there is also a transnational egg donor market of oocytes
between the North and Global South.180
Research on transnational egg donation has
observed that eggs are generally purchased in countries
where the cost of eggs is lower—from “relatively

179
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impoverished vendor populations.”181 This exacerbates
concerns around the coercion and undue inducement of
donors. Michal Nahman conducted ethnographic research
on the experience of Romanian egg sellers. These egg
sellers were engaging in what she terms “reverse
trafficking.”182 Egg donors were going through the
donation process at a private Israeli-owned clinic in
Romania. The eggs were then fertilized at the clinic, and
the embryos were imported to intended parents in Israel.
Nahman illustrates how the egg sellers that she studies
have to, and do, become “savvy participants (even
entrepreneurs)” of the neoliberal economy.183 In an
economy where citizenship, and thus worth, is equated
with buying power, egg donors capitalize on their bodies
(through selling their eggs), which enables them to
participate in the market. Ultimately, Nahman argues that
the reverse traffic nature of this process heightens
inequalities among cisgender women who are situated
differently globally. Since the egg donors’ eggs are just
sent to the intended parents, the egg donor is invisible to
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the intended parents. Her and her role are obfuscated.184
This phenomenon might exacerbate concerns of cisgender
women being commoditized, since the donors themselves
are reduced to just being the source of the eggs.
Concerns about cisgender women being
commoditized are particularly high in the context of
transnational gestational surrogacy. Scholars have
remarked that it is the “bodies of poor brown women that
now produce babies for rich (primarily) white women and
men.”185 Research on cisgender women acting as
surrogates for transnational couples has found that these
women are aware of their life circumstances and are
making choices that provide them with economic
advancement and that are best for themselves and their
families.186 There is agency in these choices to participate
in this form of labour.187 Using the example of surrogacy
in India, there are several aspects of the experience that
make it seem as though women’s bodies are treated as
184
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though they are owned by intended parents, and/or that
their bodies are being commoditized. Firstly, disparity in
material conditions is what has made it such that there is an
abundance of Southern surrogates for Northern parents.188
Amrita Pande describes how many of the surrogates that
she interviewed in India are poor, rural women.189 Fertility
clinics take advantage of the socioeconomic vulnerability
of these women, as well as their anxieties about being bad
mothers (for instance, by not being able to provide for their
children), in order to recruit them.190
Secondly, surrogates often stay in a surrogacy
hostel throughout the duration of the pregnancy, where
they are separated from their families, have to eat certain
food, and are limited in what they are allowed to do.191 The
large number of restrictions on their freedom while they are
pregnant give the impression that intended parents own
their body while surrogates carry intended parents’ babies.
They are told that they are just providing a home in their
womb and that they are to care for the baby and love it more
than their own—because it’s someone else’s. However,
they also are told not to get too attached to the child, since
this is only temporary. As Pande explains, a surrogate
needs to be a nurturing mother while also recognizing their
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disposability as a worker.192 Expectations such as these,
that treat the pregnancy as external, might result in
surrogates feeling alienated from their bodies. Thirdly,
some surrogates are valued higher because of having
certain characteristics like lighter skin. Lisa Ikemoto
argues that there is also racial distancing that occurs
between intended parents and surrogates. She remarks that
the non-whiteness of the surrogate, and them being in a
southern location distinguishes them racially from the
commissioning couple.193 This might limit intended
parents’ scope for empathy.194 This differential value that
is placed on surrogates and distancing from them might
lead to these women being reduced to a monetary value.
A relational perspective of intended parents’
relationship with egg donors and surrogates, if embryos are
treated as property, reveals that intended parents might be
perceived as owning egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies.
Even if egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies are not
perceived as being owned by intended parents, they might
be reduced to commodities, especially when intended
parents are paying for eggs or for the surrogacy. When egg
donors and surrogates are perceived of as commodities this
can result in them experiencing alienation from their
reproductive capacities, being reduced to “means to an
end,” and can involve them being coerced to sell their
reproductive labour. The literature on domestic egg
donation and surrogacy is largely positive and indicates
192
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that these concerns are not reflected in the lived
experiences of donors and surrogates. However, at this
point, there is insufficient research on the experiences of
domestic Canadian egg donors and surrogates to make an
accurate assessment. Existing research on transnational
surrogacy and egg donation suggests that the interaction of
gender, race, and class make concerns about ownership and
commodification more pronounced for surrogates and egg
donors in the Global South who are performing labour for
intended parents traveling from the North.
It is unclear to what extent treating embryos as
property would feed into donors and surrogates being
treated as owned, or commoditized. It is possible that
embryos being categorized as property is too far removed
from the egg donors, whose eggs are used to create them,
and from the surrogates who might carry them.
Alternatively, if the result of egg donors’ and intended
parents’ efforts are treated as property that can be owned,
this might exacerbate a belief that the women (donors and
surrogates) who were paid to create these embryos, are
ownable commodities. Rethinking property in the way
suggested by Petchesky could be a way to ensure that selfownership no longer implies that women’s bodies then
become commodities.195
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CONCLUSION
Whilst I am not able to provide definitive answers on the
ramifications to cisgender women of treating embryos as
property, a feminist relational analysis reveals that
categorizing embryos as property adds to an alarming
power imbalance between cisgendered heterosexual
intended parents in the context of disputes over embryos,
and that categorizing embryos as property could perpetuate
the idea that cisgender women’s bodies are ownable.
Particularly in the context of transnational surrogacy and
egg donation, categorizing embryos as property could
create a domino effect whereby egg donors’ and
surrogates’ bodies, which enable the creation of this
“property,” are viewed as commodities. These findings are
significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, at this point
S.H. v D.H. is one of only a few cases in Canada on embryo
disputes, and the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the
Superior Court’s decision which treated embryos as
property. Thus, we have not had the chance to get a sense
for what the full effects, for cisgender women, of
categorizing embryos as property would be. This might
soon change, since the number of individuals and couples
creating and storing embryos in Canada is on the rise.196
This will inevitably lead to more disputes that courts will
196

The Canadian Assisted Reproductive Technology Registry provides
yearly data on the use of these technologies in Canada. This data shows
a constant yearly rise in the number of IVF cycles performed each year.
See e.g. Better Outcomes Registry & Network Ontario, Canadian
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Register Plus (CARTR).
Preliminary treatment cycle data for 2017 (Montreal, 2018), online
(pdf):
Canadian
Fertility
and
Andrology
Society
<cfas.ca/_Library/cartr_annual_reports/CFAS-CARTR-Pluspresentation-Sept-2018-FINAL-for-CFAS-website.pdf>.

384

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019]

be asked to resolve. If there are more disputes, where
embryos are treated as property, this will mean that we
might soon feel the negative effects to cisgender women in
a bigger way. There might be no ramifications of this
categorization. The ramifications might also be worse than
I have predicted here. Second, if the ramifications of
treating embryos as property are as I have predicted, then
this will become one more way that women’s unique
reproductive capacities, which should be appreciated and
used to empower women, are in fact used to disempower
women. In the same vein, this will become yet another way
that the concept of property will intersect with gender, race,
and class, and be used as a tool to oppress women,
particularly racialized women.
This research also highlights a number of issues for
further thought and areas for future research. Firstly, it
highlights areas where there are gaps, or insufficient
amounts of research, in the existing literature. We need
further research on how couples make decisions about
dividing embryos in a dispute, on the experiences of
Canadian egg donors and surrogates, and on the
experiences of transnational egg donors and surrogates.
Although it was beyond the scope of this paper, research is
needed on how categorizing embryos as property might
affect other relationships. In particular, it would be helpful
to have research on the effects of categorizing embryos as
property on the relationships between egg donors and
children born through donated oocytes, and surrogates and
children carried by a surrogate. Finally, this research
suggests possible areas for law and policy reform. In the
context of law and policy related to disputes over frozen
embryos, one suggestion for law reform is that cisgender
women should be given preference to use embryos where
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a woman and her cisgender male partner are in a dispute.197
More radically, this research points to flaws with our
traditional definitions of property, and associated concepts
of ownership and self-ownership. It suggests that perhaps
the most prudent step is to rethink our outdated
understanding of these concepts altogether.198
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